





# Stakeholders involvement: Learning from PR experience for geological disposal of the radioactive wastes

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"Engaging in Stakeholder Dialogue for the first time feels like making a proposal of marriage.

One knows it is absolutely the right thing to do but always those lingering doubts remain. Unlike betrothal, the desire for Stakeholder Dialogue rarely flows from a deep affection for the stakeholders. Often it is precisely the opposite."

Rupert Wilcox-Baker, BNFL, August 2002

### **STATUS**

Geological disposal is now the accepted solution for RW in every country that has a final management solution.

In Europe, at the end of its recent five-year programme the EC declared (EC, 2004) that:

"Disposal in deep (>300 metre) geological repositories, the favoured strategy in Europe for long-lived high-level radioactive waste, is now possible".

Geological disposal was first formally advanced as an appropriate, safe solution to radioactive management almost **fifty** years ago, in the United States (NAS, 1957).

THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND

Report of the Committee on Waste Disposal of the Division of Earth Sciences


Committee Members

Harry H. Hess, Chairman
John N. Adkins William B. Heroy
William E. Benson M. King Hubbert
John C. Frye Richard J. Russell
Charles V. Theis

Publication 519
Price \$1.00

National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council
Washington, D. C.
September 1957

### Disposal Programmes take Decades.....



The delays have been in part due to the complexity of some of the **technical** tasks. More often, however, delays have resulted from a failure to integrate the technical and the **societal** issues associated with repository development.



Committee on Radioactive Waste Management

Learning from the past Listening for the future

How should the UK manage radioactive waste?

**2nd Consultation Document** 

4th April to 27th June 2005

## Some key features of the last 30 years

- all programmes have had some failures; some have failed several times and some have stopped completely
- all programmes have begun by being technically led
  - in common with many other national enterprises
- failures have resulted from lack of recognition of:
  - sensitivity of key decision points
  - public fear of the nuclear sector (peaking in 1980s-90s) and lack of trust in science and technology
  - lack of political backing (politicians will hesitate over difficult, non-urgent decisions)
- successes have been seen where:
  - programmes move at a measured pace
  - programmes are stable and consistent
  - concerned local communities have an interest in the project
- Success or failure occurs at critical programme points where decisions have to be made (often, outside the programme)

## **Examples of possible stakeholders**

- > the general public;
- demographic groups (like young people);
- > residents, representatives or elected officials of local communities;
- national/regional government ministries/departments;
- regulators;
- > trade unions;
- > the media;
- > the scientific research community;
- implementing organisations;
- the nuclear industry;
- international organisations.

## The opposition can have various reasons:

- > can be part of the widespread genuine anxiety about nuclear matters;
- ➤ it can be a deliberate tactic to <u>hinder</u> the development of nuclear power;
- ➤ it may reflect public scepticism towards any <u>new</u>, major technological development;
- ➤ it may result from the failure of the nuclear industry to accept the importance of interacting with the concerned public.

## It takes three to tango ...but it took time to realize it

- ➤ After 2nd world war, shortages and cold war gave experts the legitimacy to decide: expert = decision maker
- ➤ Later difficulties and recognition that alternatives are possible led to distinguish the roles. expert ≠ decision maker
- ➤ Later crises in health and environment caused a number of independent actors to ask for "public policies" defined and implemented through "decision making processes", with stakeholders participation.
- Complexity of issues, complexity of the social system have led to: An interplay among three types of actors: public, experts, decision makers

#### On stakeholder involvement

Stakeholder involvement is a key concept in modern approaches to governance. Not recognising its relevance will, most likely, lead one to failure.

NWD countries are moving away from a traditional "decide, announce and defend" model, for which the focus was almost exclusively on technical content, to one of "engage, interact and co-operate", for which both technical content and quality of process are of comparable import to a constructive outcome. Organisational ability to learn, to communicate and to adapt now moves into the foreground.

### Requirements on geological disposal programmes

The requirements over and above straightforward technical feasibility can be grouped under the following headings:

- · Safety:....
- Security: .....
- Environmental acceptability: ....
- Economic viability:.....
- Ethics: Can geological repositories be implemented without being "unfair" to any of the present day stakeholders or to future generations, who should also not be subjected to unnecessary burdens?
- Public acceptability: What are the public views on waste repositories? How can the public best be included in the decision making processes? Can a sufficient degree of societal consensus be achieved?

As a committee of the US National Research Council recently pointed out, "the main challenges are societal rather than technical" (NRC, 2001).

#### **INFORMING THE PUBLIC**

- > Social and ethical issues are at least as important as technical issues.
- ➤ Public involvement, at the *earliest* possible stage, is perhaps the most vital requirement, although it will not necessarily be enough. The public deserves and should have our respect. We cannot expect their trust if we do not trust them. Without them we are lost.

## LEGAL BASIS FOR INVOLVEMENT OF THE STAKEHODLERS

#### Calls and Legal Bases for Stakeholder Involvement

Member countries in the European Union are bound by the terms of Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (85/337/EEC as amended by 97/11/EC) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) (2001/42/EC). Crucially, they make specific provision for informing the public and neighbouring EU Member States.

In France, the Radioactive Waste Act of 1991 introduced a compulsory consultation with the local authorities and the population before surface investigations for an underground laboratory for research in waste disposal could start.

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act increases the opportunities for participation in industrial project planning by affected stakeholders, including the public.

In the United States there are statutory requirements on stakeholder involvement connected to the issuance of an Environmental Impact Statement.

## STAGED APPROACH

## STAGED APPROACH examples

**FRANCE** – first URL, than Parliament is to designate a site for the disposal facility

**SWEDEN** - licensing a repository in two steps. The first step involves the full licensing of a small repository (containing about 10% of the waste). After an operation period, the experience will be evaluated and a decision will be made whether to go ahead and dispose of the remainder of the waste or to retrieve it

**UK** - steps of research, dialogue, consultation, and choice regarding both waste management options and sites for waste management facilities (Nirex, 2000)

**US** - existing licensing regulations for a proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, provide for stepwise review and decision making with respect to construction, authorisation, initial receipt of waste, and repository closure.

#### **BASICS OF STAGED APPROACH**

The most comprehensive discussion is contained in "One step at a time" (NRC, 2003).

- The stages are deliberately planned with the objective of gaining further knowledge or experience that might lead to amendments of a subsequent stage.
- At the decision points between stages (and at any other major decisions that might arise) a broad and open participation in the decision process is designed into the overall staging.
- To the maximum extent possible, the steps are designed to be reversible, in case subsequent experience reveals that the chosen direction does not help progress towards the chosen goals.

## **INCENTIVES**

#### COMPENSATIONS

#### **USA** (2 types)

- Financial assistance <u>during characterisation</u> of the repository / construction of centralised storage
- > Agreement on benefits to state after selection is made

#### Korea

- >Applicable to municipalities within 5 km of nuclear power plant
- > Financial resources for specific projects during construction and operation
  - <u>Direct programmes</u>: public works, education, public information
  - <u>Indirect programmes</u>: deductions in electricity prices, improve life quality, support to industrial activities

#### **France**

- ➤ Only regulated <u>compensations</u> for underground laboratories
- > Sponsorships of activities in hosting municipalities by ANDRA

#### **Switzerland**

➤ Nuclear power plants negotiate <u>contracts</u> with the hosting municipalities

#### Sweden

➤ According to the Law, the <u>expenses of information campaigns</u> and Local Committees of Information can be reimbursed in the locations where SKB is undertaking feasibility studies.

#### **CONCEPTS OF COMPENSATIONS**

#### **Definition in dictionary:**

To compensate: to make amends for, or to recompense: to counterbalance"

Compensation: act of compensating: amends for loss sustained

#### Legal contexts:

counterbalance the expected risks of projects on local communities for benefits

#### **Economic theories:**

risk-benefit trade-off

#### **Politics:**

Combine the interests of the potential hosting communities with general interests

## International stakeholder networking and programs



#### **OBRA**

- (1) To establish a European networking platform between universities, implementers, stakeholders and civil society in general,
- (2) To develop a model of a European Observatory for long-term governance,
- (3) To test the efficiency of a pilot training package as a mechanism for the transfer and dissemination of knowledge to local and regional stakeholders,
- (4) To make recommendations on how the model of the Observatory could be implemented.





#### **COWAM (2001)**

Collective reflection on the way to improve NWM Decision Making Processes (DMP) at local and regional levels in Europe

Create the conditions for local actors to participate actively, bring their views and concerns, network at European level

Facilitate a fair, equitable dialogue of local actors with implementers, public authorities and experts

Issue recommendations for improving the quality of decision making in NWM, notably at local level in Europe

#### Aim

To agree on a participatory methodology for decision-making processes regarding the siting of a facility (*how* rather than where)

#### **Objectives**


To learn from COWAM I and similar experiences

To understand the values, expectations and concerns of the different stakeholders

To suggest guidelines to build public awareness in the management, governance and responsibility of conflictive projects

To design a decision-making process

#### **Structure of COWAM**



### **FSC**

The Forum on Stakeholder Confidence (FSC) was created under a mandate from the RWM Committee of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) to facilitate the sharing of international experience in addressing the societal dimension of RWM (August 2000).

The new dynamic of dialogue and decision-making process has been characterised by the FSC as a shift from the traditional "decide, announce and defend" model, focussed exclusively on technical content, to one of "engage, interact and co-operate"

## **OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL PROGRAMS**

#### **SWEDEN**

- In October 1992 SKB sent a letter to all 286 municipalities in Sweden. In this letter the work of managing and disposing of nuclear waste was presented.
- A municipality agreed to let SKB conduct a feasibility study (thus it declared an interest in hosting a final repository for spent nuclear fuel).
- Therefore, both SKB and the municipalities had reasons for participating in a feasibility study, and could be said to be strategic actors.

This kind of siting strategy provided a way beyond a narrow technocratic siting strategy: offering local politicians and concerned citizens a say in the siting process with some room to negotiate where to store spent nuclear fuel.

- In 1993 Storuman and Malå municipalities decided to allow SKB to carry out feasibility studies.
- However, local residences voted against later on. Reason of failure the steering committees were elite organizations for important negotiations, with no invovment of the general public.
- 1995 general assessment of the geological suitability of the five "nuclear" municipalities. After that there was the request for letting performing feasibility studies. Got yes from some.

Main new principles - The stakeholder involvement! Staged veto right (before feasibility study and construction). Financial support from the Nuclear Waste Fund (2 mln Kr, 1995). Municipalities did go as far as to establish three different local groups.



**1998** 

#### Absence of any dialog

- >BNFL's vision was "to become the leading global nuclear company".
- > Adverse media coverage, consequent political concern made BNFL a contentious business.
- > Accused of not providing any or enough information, or of favouring certain stakeholders over others.
- "Attack and defence" typified relationships with stakeholders.

1998 ----

#### **Entering into dialog**

- ➤ Recognition that Dialogue offered unique opportunity to explore overtly antagonistic positions with a view to revealing underlying common ground.
- > Broke away from "Decide, Announce, Defend" without removing the ultimate responsibility of management to decide and then act.
- > Allowed existing ideas to be examined from new perspectives.



#### **Range of Working Groups**

Working Groups made up of volunteers from the Main Group organisations and interest groups.

#### Increasingly controversial topics covered in the six years of the BNFL Dialogue:

- > Waste
- Discharges
- Spent Fuel Management Options
- > Plutonium
- Business Futures
- Security


#### **Lessons learned**

- ➤ The BNFL Dialogue over 8 years has demonstrated an approach to tackling one of the most contentious and complex areas of UK policy
- > As well as the *products* of the Dialogue, significant *process* learning and *capacity building* has been achieved
- > This process learning is both useable within the nuclear sector but also easily transferable to other challenging policy areas

#### What did BNFL gain from engagement?

- > Extensive range of BNFL's stakeholders now possess far greater understanding of Company's operations, constraints and opportunities
- ➤ Informed evolving Company structure as it adapts to a new UK focus on cleanup and decommissioning of nuclear sites
- ➤ Recommendations from the Dialogue provided context for research and development programmes.
- > Commitment from the Board downwards for continuing engagement with stakeholders.
- Change in BNFL <u>culture</u> about accessibility to information.
- > Presumption information will be made available, if not, explain why.
- ➤ Change in way BNFL seeks to communicate, making business and technical information more accessible, capable of being questioned and understood
- > Change in way BNFL is perceived trust has increased.

## **Hungary**




Currently 5% of annual investment cost (the cost of site investigation) are being distributed among the Information Associations.

## **Hungary**

- ➤ These associations <u>keep the public informed</u> in the surrounding area, including settlements which do not belong to the associations, regarding research activities and/or operation of the site.
- ➤ They monitor the research and/or the waste disposal procedures and participate in preparation of the necessary decisions.

# THE LEGAL BACKGROUND WITH REGARD TO THE STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT



#### Article 10:

In order to regularly provide information to the population of the communities in the vicinity of the facilities, the licensee of a nuclear power plant as well as that of a radioactive waste disposal facility shall promote the establishment of a public control and information association and can grant assistance to its activities.

Consequently, the law established the legal basis of providing financial incentives for the supportive group of municipalities.

# **Hungary**

#### **Prehistory:**

In 1976: a decision was made to site a repository for disposal of L/ILW. In 1990, the Minister in charge refused giving the construction permit (Ofalu site).

#### The failure due to:

- > Site was suitable, but political and social background was unfavourable.
- Directed siting concept failed
- > Preparation of the project was unsuccessful in terms of public acceptance.
- ➤ No efficient information programme in the communities affected by the development.
- ➤ No sociological impact assessment and no compensation scheme on a competitive basis were considered.

#### **Lessons learned:**

- ➤ The proponent /NPP/ is inappropriate company for conducting the public consultation program /alone/.
- > Public involvement and voluntary approach in early stage is vital of important.
- Negotiation about the incentives should start as early as possible.

# **Hungary**

# **New strategy**

- alternatives (disposal method, site)
- discrete stages of siting
- cooperative siting model (volunteerism)
- mixed approach (site suitability+ public acceptance)
- offer economic incentives





# **Finnland**



**ONKALO** construction started in 2004

## Finnland

# Quality and transparency of scientific and technological programme

- looking for a (geologically) suitable site key starting point
- involving not only the local population, but all the scientists to communicate with the local people




Kallionäytteet ovat olleet kesän aikana suuren kiinnostuksen kohteena.

"During the summer the bedrock samples have been the object of large interest"

#### **ONKALO** construction



### **Finnland**



### **BELGIUM**

# 1997 Government decision to start participatory process Communities with nuclear facilities → all reacted Volunteering communities → no reaction

Representativeness important issue "60 out of the 8500 inhabitants of Dessel makes almost 1% of the people participate in the local partnership"

#### **Composition of a partnership (MONA)**

	members	Of which Political actors	Of which social actors	Of which economical actors	Of which O/N
General assembly	36	15	12	8	1
Executive committee	12	4	4	3	1

Working groups	Members	Members of an organisation	Individual inhabitants	Experts (O/N, university)
Implantation and design	19	7	10	2
Environment and health	17	7	8	2
Safety	13	9	3	1
Local Development	13	8	3	2
Total	62	31	24	7

### **BELGIUM**

# **Communication (MONA)**

- > Local office in the middle of the town.
- > Newsletter: 4 page letter on nuclear issues.
- > 'The MONA newspaper' explained the population the MONA results.
- > Every family in the village received a MONA calendar.
- > Website with, in 2004, 6000 unique visitors.
- > Film that shows where and under which conditions implantation.
- Game that makes the players form a nuanced point of view.
- > MONA presented itself in organisations of the community.
- > MONA was present at the local Christmas market.
- Promo-campaign with bread bags, beer cards, radio spots.
- > Several discussion evenings.

# **NUMO Publicity Activities (Japan)**

### TV

- TV program sponsorship started from Oct., 2002
- Daily news program (with 30sec ad/day) & news show (every Sunday)

# **Newspaper advertisements**

- 5 major national, 5 regional and 39 local papers
- more than 80% of the nation covered

# **Magazine advertisements**

Popular, special-interest and governmental

# **NUMO's forum and panel discussions**

- Forum co-hosted with leading local mass media at 31 major cities of the 47 Prefectures
- 24 panel discussions in the local newspapers (as of March 2004)

# **RWD** in Lithuania



KARŠTAS komentaras

Seimo narvs Gediminas Jakavonis kreipėsi i

Ministra Pirmininka, Ūkio ministra ir Valstybės

saugumo departamenta del spaudoje išdestytu

faktu dėl neskaidraus Europos Sajungos lėšu

naudojimo perkant konteinerius panaudotam

branduoliniam kurui (PBK) ir rengiant saugyklas

Parlamentaro nuomone, tokie abejotini sandėriai

su skandalingai Ukrainoje pagarsėjusių Vokietijos

kompanijos RWENUKEM darbuotoju R.Gohringu

ateityje gali virsti daug kainuosiančia Lietuvos

Aplinkos apsaugos komiteto pirmininko pavaduotojas G.Jakavonis.

Ignalinos atominėje elektrinėje.

gyventojams problema.

Neskaidrūs sandėriai dėl panaudoto

"Ypatingai brangių vokiškų konteinerių, skirtų saugoti panaudotą galiojimo laikas yra tik 50

metų. Mano žiniomis, šie konteineriai yra netinkami transportuoti. Kyla labai daug klausimų, į

kuriuos kol kas jokių atsakymų nėra. O tai kelia grėsmę tiek Lietuvos, tiek kaimyninių šalių

gyventojų sveikatai, nes ateityje išlieka radiacijos patekimo į aplinką pavojus",- įsitikinęs Seimo

Seimo narvs G.Jakavonis

branduolinio kuro tvarkymo gali

virsti atomine katastrofa Lietuvai



2007 Sausio 26. Penktadienis

RAŠYKITE MUMS









Lietuviškai





По-русски



Enalish





### uiienos

# vu politiniu belaisviu politika
























Užuodžiant eilini perversma

Rytojaus laikraštis

Kur jūs, Lietuvos anos politkovskajos? Nesamoniu kampelis, Arba "heroininė"

valstybės politika


Priešu tankai nepraeis!

#### ... plačiau



#### Politika





VSD tiria A.Matulevičiaus ryšius su KGB

Kur A.Dudajeva rengs tribunolą V.Putinui -

Lietuvoje ar Estijoje?

A.Kubilius verčia A.Pocių už butelį? V.Uspaskichas rengiasi V.Adamkaus



#### Po nepriklausomybės atstatvmo Lietuva

Karštas komentaras.

- paveldėjo, sakyčiau, idealiai suorganizuota elektros üki turėjome palvointi
- ernia Ignalinos branduoline jėgaine, kuri netus gamindavo daugiau kaip17 rdu kwh elektros energijos, kitu mūsu

giausiai. To iš TSRS paveldėto elektros

dabartinė atstatomoji vertė yra maždaug

Jei Konservatoriu partijai

savo itakon paimti tokias institucijas, kaip VSD, tai

🞮 demokratija galėtumėte

doti. Gal jau pamiršote 1996-2000

ervatoriu valdymo metus, kurie i

vos istoriją bus įrašyti kaip patys

servatorių partija siejama su

Partijos Tvarka ir

ydamas sustabdyti tolesnę Tėvynės

teisingumas (liberalai

kreipėsi į Teisingumo ministra Petra Baguška,

demokratai) Prezidiumas

žiausi pačios juodžiausios valdžios

pavyktų Lietuvoje įsigalėti ir

riniu gamybiniai pajėgumai siekė dar apie ilijardu kwh elektros, patriotai buvo ake Kruonio hidroakumuliacinės rinės, bet ja pasistatėme – ji akumuliuoja

ilijardu litu. ... plačiau

ristų "globėjai"?


i? ... plačiau

rizmu

servatoriai - žmogžudžiu ir

ne laisva elektros energija ir ja avinėja piko valandomis, tai yra





Anonsas

Lankytoju skaičius ir šaliu TOP 10

Statistika

Šios dienos straipsniu TOP 10

# Lithuania


# Regular meetings with the local community

# Meetings with municipality authorities and local population

(e.g. 07.09.2006 meeting in Visaginas. Typical questions – compensations; any transportation of RW from other countries to the repository; what site is the best; pollution of the ground water)

# Inquiry and information campaigns

(2007 – informing population on ongoing activities, what are expectations of the local community, compensations to be asked...)



## **LERNING**

# **Three general principles**

Decision-making should be performed through <u>iterative</u> processes, providing the flexibility to adapt to contextual changes, e.g., by implementing <u>stepwise</u> approach that assures sufficient time for developing a competent and fair discourse

Social learning should be facilitated, e.g., by promoting interaction between the various stakeholders and the experts

Public involvement in <u>decision-making</u> processes should be facilitated, e.g., promote constructive and high-quality communication between individuals with different knowledge, beliefs, interests, values, and worldviews

### **LERNING 1**

# **Changing environment**

Technology is no longer perceived as the bright future

Projects are not trusted and rejected when stakeholders have not been actively involved

# **Dynamics of dialogue**

The technical side is no longer of unique importance: ability to communicate, to negotiate and to adapt is necessary

Need to "engage, interact and co-operate". rather than "decide, announce, defend"

### **LERNING 2**

- > Contact as much relevant actors as possible before the process is formalised
- Once the process is started you need to keep it going and not change it
- > Try to have at least two initial partners
- ➤ Local people can be motivated/willing to spent time during several years under condition:
  - **▶**People see an evolution
  - People see openness for their ideas

## Yet.....

There is nothing so easy to learn as experience and nothing so hard to apply.

Josh Billings



#### Klaipeda Wind Meal Park (35 MW)

Owner UAB Baltic New Energy (Lithuania & Denmark)

Project started in 2004

Investments – 33 MEur

Pay back – 10 years

24 wind meals (constructed 6)

### **Dismantled - September 2007**

Formal reason of dismantling of the park – locals complained of drop of land prices, the court supperted the protest of the local community. The real reason – arrogant attitude of the company to the local community

The part of renewables in the Lithuanian energy market is only 3.5% (must be 7% by 2010). Presently 35 wind meals operating in Lithuania



# Thank you for your attention

