

# **Control of induced seismic hazard associated with the hydraulic stimulation of a hot fractured rock geothermal reservoir**

Steve Oates, Julian Bommer et al



# Acknowledgements:

Thanks to LaGeo who we partnered in the El Salvador project and also to the people of the Berlín area.

Thanks to ISS International who supplied, installed & helped maintain the seismic system.

Talk based on material presented in the Engineering Geology paper:

***Control of hazard due to seismicity induced by a hot fractured rock geothermal project***

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# Outline

- Background: the area and recent earthquakes
- The traffic light – conceptual framework
- Seismic catalogue and hydraulic data
- What is the difference between Geothermal and Oil & Gas stimulations?
- Conclusions

# El Salvador and the Berlín Geothermal field





**Volcán Chichontepeque**






**Faulting in recent volcanic deposits along a road cutting near San Martín**



# An area of high natural seismicity and high risk



Landslide at Santa Tecla triggered by  
13/01/01 event



Recent major earthquakes in El Salvador.

# Damage to vulnerable buildings due to 2001 events




Adobe (sun dried clay brick)




Bahareque (wattle and daub)



Significant number of low quality dwellings in the area around well TR8A.



# Summary of seismic hazard analysis (after Udías)





Based on discussion in Udías, "Principles of Seismology".



# Control of the injection process

A clearly defined control strategy based on pre-defined thresholds of intensity of induced ground movements and frequency of occurrence.



- Red. The fracc is going out of bounds or seismicity is exceeding acceptable levels. STOP or reduce pump rate and reassess.
- Orange. The fracc is growing away from planned direction or level of seismicity is higher than expected. CAUTION – be ready to stop.
- Green. Fracc growth and levels of seismicity within planned bounds. GO – continue and maintain regular reporting.

# The elements of the traffic light system

1. Incorporates basic elements of seismic hazard analysis
  - Analysis of background seismicity
  - Derivation of PGV attenuation relation from analogue data
  - Vulnerability estimates based on survey of local buildings
2. Constructed in terms of PGV (more indicative of damage potential than PGA)
3. PGV-equivalent magnitude derived for each event
4. Near real-time data processing – events mapped onto pseudo Gutenberg-Richter plot.
5. PGV thresholds on pseudo Gutenberg Richter plot derived from:
  - Guidelines for induced vibrations (eg. blasting, traffic, pile-driving)
  - Correlations between PGV and Modified Mercalli Intensity
  - Vulnerability curves for local housing
6. Accelerographs at 3 key locations – used to update PGV attenuation relation




# Hydraulic injection operations in a populated area



Bahareque housing near TR8A.  
Note the typical heavy roof on a weak framework.

# Vulnerability curves for local housing stock






# The traffic light plot & PGV-equivalent magnitude

Attenuation relation for PGV:

$$\log_{10} \text{PGV} = a + b M - c \log_{10} R$$

*PGV-equivalent magnitude* then defined with respect to a reference depth:

$$M_{\text{equiv}} = M + (c/b) \log_{10} (D_{\text{ref}} / D)$$




Traffic light operation:

The following steps executed automatically (using *cron* facility)

- Event hypocentre and magnitude determined in (near) real-time
- PGV at epicentre estimated using attenuation relation
- PGV-equivalent magnitude calculated for a depth of 2km
- Data point added to traffic light plot (pseudo Gutenberg-Richter plot with thresholds) displayed on screen in pump control room

# Map showing layout of monitoring array



Black symbols – stations of the ISS network

White symbols – ETNA accelerograph stations

Grey scale gives ground elevation in m above mean sea level






Rotary pump spread at TR8 well-site




# Map view of event locations from periods of injection




Considering only the events in the immediate vicinity of TR8A.....

# Cumulative moment against pumped volume



McGarr plot taking only the events in the neighbourhood of TR8A.

# Complete seismic catalogue for project




Section view showing all event hypocentres 30<sup>th</sup> October 2002 – 12<sup>th</sup> February 2004




# The large event of September 16

Strong-motion  
accelerograph recorded at  
MAS during 16 September  
event



PGV damage *threshold*  
exceeded ....

....but no reports or  
observations of damage  
(lower PGV values observed  
at SBO & HGZ)



# Comparing typical HDR and oil&gas projects

## .... for discussion

	HFR Geothermal	Oil and gas
<b>Rock type</b>	Hard	Soft
<b>Stress regime</b>	Unstable	Stable
<b>Permeability</b>	Low	High
<b>Seismic activity (background)</b>	High	Low
<b>Hydraulic fracturing</b>	Long T, high V	Short T, low V
<b>Felt seismicity during hydro- fracs?</b>	Yes	No?
<b>Felt seismicity during production?</b>	No?	Yes
<b>Long term disposal/re-injection</b>	Yes	Yes
<b>Primary risks</b>	Induced seismicity during stimulation or circulation	Compaction during production or breach of cap-rock during injection
<b>Risk management options</b>	Active control of injection (acid frac, traffic lights,...) then manage as community issue	Full project risk analysis (+active control of injection) then manage as community issue

# Conclusions

- A workable and rational system for monitoring and controlling hazard due to induced seismicity – being adopted by other projects (eg. Basel)
- Thresholds designed conservatively and vindicated by observations and recorded motions
- Induced seismicity lower than expected so system not fully tested.
- Approach does not address the problem of post shut-in events.
- Induced seismicity a more immediate hazard for geothermal projects....
- .... but better chance of controlling hazard than in oil and gas projects

# Learnings & outstanding issues

- Must develop techniques for addressing the post shut-in events
- Requires good quality real-time processing: autopickers must be improved
- Need good coverage and location accuracy
- Integrate accelerographs as remote stations in the monitoring array





Aiden Bernie with the pump system he designed and installed